Sensitivity analysis for a Cournot equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0167-6377(90)90030-9zbMath0715.90036OpenAlexW2036329413MaRDI QIDQ751982

Roger L. Tobin

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(90)90030-9

zbMATH Keywords

variational inequalitiessensitivity analysisCournot equilibriumnonlinear complementarity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonlinear programming (90C30) Variational inequalities (49J40) Sensitivity, stability, parametric optimization (90C31) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (2)

Uniqueness results and algorithm for Stackelberg-Cournot-Nash equilibria ⋮ Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The Cournot oligopoly and competitive equilibria as solutions to nonlinear complementarity problems
• Sensitivity analysis for variational inequalities
• Contributions to Cournot oligopoly theory
• Uniqueness results and algorithm for Stackelberg-Cournot-Nash equilibria
• Sensitivity Analysis for Variational Inequalities Defined on Polyhedral Sets
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
• Sensitivity Analysis in Variational Inequalities
• Strongly Regular Generalized Equations
• Sensitivity Analysis for Variational Inequalities
• A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium
• Uniqueness and differentiability of solutions of parametric nonlinear complementarity problems
• Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations

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