Equilibria in multi-party competition under uncertainty

DOI10.1007/BF01395725zbMath0732.90006OpenAlexW2083873884MaRDI QIDQ809849

André de Palma, Gap-Seon Hong, Jacques-François Thisse

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01395725

zbMATH Keywords

political competitionideal pointcontinuum of alternativescontinuum of votersmedian voter positionmultiplicity of Nash equilibriaplatform configuration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Equilibria in non-cooperative competition of political parties having a common rate of morality ⋮ Robust equilibria in location games ⋮ Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don't always go to the closest firm ⋮ Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm ⋮ Stability of equilibria in multi-party political systems

Cites Work

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• Multi-agent equilibria with market share and ranking objectives
• Pareto optimality in spatial voting models
• The relationship between Luce's choice axiom, Thurstone's theory of comparative judgment, and the double exponential distribution
• The structure of random utility models
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Holds under Sufficient Heterogeneity
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition

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