Simple games with many effective voters
From MaRDI portal
Publication:844903
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.015zbMath1197.91079MaRDI QIDQ844903
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.015
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