A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires

DOI10.1007/s10058-008-0042-yzbMath1140.91317OpenAlexW1985716293MaRDI QIDQ934970

Stefano Vannucci

Publication date: 31 July 2008

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/437.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

core stabilitycoalitional game formsgovernment forms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

The structure of unstable power mechanisms

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Effectivity functions and stable governance structures
• Effectivity functions and associated claim game correspondences
• Nonmanipulable Cores

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