Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good
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Publication:992055
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0488-3zbMath1195.91045OpenAlexW1966802454MaRDI QIDQ992055
Publication date: 8 September 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0488-3
utilitarian welfare maximizationadmission rules for excludable public goodsrandomization in optimal mechanisms
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