If you are offered the right of first refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.10.013zbMath1167.91014DBLPjournals/geb/GrosskopfR09OpenAlexW3022391665WikidataQ57935138 ScholiaQ57935138MaRDI QIDQ1002331

Alvin E. Roth, Brit Grosskopf

Publication date: 25 February 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4261988

zbMATH Keywords

contract designbargaining experimentsright of first refusal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• An impossibility result concerning \(n\)-person bargaining games
• Reinforcement and directional learning in the ultimatum game with responder competition
• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Kidney Exchange
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
• Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• Architecture of Power Markets

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