An axiomatic theory of political representation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1001832
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.005zbMath1154.91376OpenAlexW2027851909MaRDI QIDQ1001832
Publication date: 19 February 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-092845210
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