Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
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Publication:1042133
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2008.10.021zbMath1176.91054OpenAlexW2029161897MaRDI QIDQ1042133
Publication date: 7 December 2009
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.10.021
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Cites Work
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