Pure subgame-perfect equilibria in free transition games

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2008.11.038zbMath1176.91011OpenAlexW2085322629MaRDI QIDQ1042162

Janos Flesch, Jeroen Kuipers, Gijs Schoenmakers

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/8eb0bb62-6f9b-46b2-8d33-611a409c8ef9

zbMATH Keywords

game theorystochastic gamesperfect informationsubgame-perfection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (8)

Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Nash-solvable two-person symmetric cycle game forms ⋮ On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of the deterministic \(n\)-person games with perfect information and mean or total effective cost ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Chess-like games may have no uniform Nash equilibria even in mixed strategies ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Subgame-perfection in free transition games

Cites Work

• Periodic stopping games
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Perfect information stochastic games and related classes
• Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games.
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Stochastic Games with Perfect Information and Time Average Payoff
• Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations

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