Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90021-2zbMath0519.90012WikidataQ56564656 ScholiaQ56564656MaRDI QIDQ1054623

Graciela Chichilnisky, Geoffrey Heal

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8495/1/MPRA_paper_8495.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

continuity; contractibility; anonymity; domain restriction; unanimity; existence of social choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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