Power indices for multicandidate voting games

DOI10.1007/BF01769257zbMath0611.90106MaRDI QIDQ1087481

Edward M. Bolger

Publication date: 1986

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769257

zbMATH Keywords

power index; simple game; multi-candidate voting games; supporting coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B14: Social choice

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Limit Property of a Multi-Choice Value and the Fuzzy Value, The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games, Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index, Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure, A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions, Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output, Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval, A set of axioms for a value for partition function games, Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games, A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives, Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies, The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities, On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index, A model of influence with a continuum of actions, Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention, The inverse problem for power distributions in committees, Unnamed Item, A Class of Efficient Values for Games in Partition Function Form, The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives

Cites Work

• Values of games in partition function form
• The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
• N‐person games in partition function form