Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games

DOI10.1007/BF01756291zbMath0632.90098MaRDI QIDQ1095822

Jean-Pierre Benoît, Vijay Krishna

Publication date: 1987

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; average payoff; one-shot game; finitely repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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Cites Work

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• Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
• Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept