Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules (Q1113779)

The paper examines the solution set described by the first author [Soc. Choice Welfare 1, 295-306 (1985; Zbl 0597.90011)] in the light of well- known consistency conditions as well as its relation to the choice functions provided by the second author [J. Econ. Theory 31, 122-132 (1983; Zbl 0525.90066)]. First the assumption of a complete strict majority relation is relaxed to obtain four different sequential choice rules, each consistent with the logic of the original and each generating a different set of outcomes. It is then shown how two of the sets are generated as outcomes under two natural tie breaking assumptions in the sequential elimination voting procedure. Next the four sets are compared to others in the literature in terms of narrowness of decision as well as in terms of their being reasonable and satisfying some choice consistency conditions.