On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets
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Publication:1211928
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(74)90004-4zbMath0292.90069MaRDI QIDQ1211928
Publication date: 1974
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90004-4
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