Some theorems on the core of a non-sidepayment game with a measure space of players

DOI10.1007/BF01753238zbMath0393.90110MaRDI QIDQ1252167

Tatsuro Ichiishi, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 1978

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Core; Measure Space of Players; Nonsidepayment Game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A07: Games with infinitely many players

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A social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem with a continuum of agents and applications, The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players, Some results on the weak core of a non-side-payment game with infinitely many players, Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects., Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores, On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players, Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players, A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents

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