On -majority voting paradoxes

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00012-2zbMATH Open0944.91017MaRDI QIDQ1296508FDOQ1296508

József Mala

Publication date: 26 September 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

tournamentsalternatives\(\lambda\)-majority relationMcGarvey's theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments
• The Voting Problem
• On Sets of Consistent Arcs in a Tournament
• Title not available (Why is that?)
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Cited In (6)

• Construction of voting situations concordant with ranking patterns
• A characterization of the \(n\)-agent Pareto dominance relation
• An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism
• Majority decisions when abstention is possible
• A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda's rule
• Smallest tournaments not realizable by \({\frac{2}{3}}\)-majority voting

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