An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0520-3zbMATH Open1278.91054OpenAlexW1983881102MaRDI QIDQ656805FDOQ656805

Robert C. Powers, Lee R. Gibson

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0520-3

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• On \(\lambda\)-majority voting paradoxes
• Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments
• The Voting Problem
• How many voters are needed for paradoxes?
• Smallest tournaments not realizable by \({\frac{2}{3}}\)-majority voting

Cited In (4)

• A characterization of the \(n\)-agent Pareto dominance relation
• POSITIVELY RESPONSIVE COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES AND MAJORITY RULE: A GENERALIZATION OF MAY'S THEOREM TO MANY ALTERNATIVES
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda's rule

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