A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games
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Publication:1313360
DOI10.1007/BF01240130zbMath0802.90133WikidataQ122924888 ScholiaQ122924888MaRDI QIDQ1313360
Publication date: 1 February 1994
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240130
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Networks and Stability, Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties, Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games, Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game, Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games, Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies, On multi-choice TU games arising from replica of economies, Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs, The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem, The Nonemptiness of the Inner Core
Cites Work
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- Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games
- A further result on the representation of games by markets
- The inner core and the strictly inhibitive set
- A characterization of polyhedral market games
- The Core of an N Person Game