On the evolution of attitudes towards risk in winner-take-all games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2537zbMath1055.91501OpenAlexW2097066146MaRDI QIDQ1306763

Suzanne Scotchmer, Eddie Dekel

Publication date: 11 November 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/28dbaf1fdce2da0a575c5a0b43b8ed4eac7acebc

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (11)

On the biological foundation of risk preferences ⋮ Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: a volunteer's dilemma experiment ⋮ Evolution of risk-taking behaviour and status preferences in anti-coordination games ⋮ The exact law of large numbers for independent random matching ⋮ Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes ⋮ The effects of risk preferences in mixed-strategy equilibria of \(2\times \)2 games ⋮ Existence of independent random matching ⋮ Gender differences in cooperation with group membership ⋮ Is risk-aversion hereditary? ⋮ Risk taking in selection contests ⋮ Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets.

Cites Work

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• An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty
• Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
• The evolution of attitudes to risk: Lottery tickets and relative wealth
• Continuous approximation of dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
• A biological basis for expected and non-expected utility
• Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium

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