\(F\)-decomposable social aggregation rules and acyclic choice
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Publication:1317315
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90034-5zbMath0801.90005OpenAlexW1973923986MaRDI QIDQ1317315
Publication date: 24 March 1994
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90034-5
fuzzy setsimple games\(F\)-decomposable social aggregation rulesacyclic social choiceNakumura number
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