Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
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Publication:1342681
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)90012-4zbMath0815.90013MaRDI QIDQ1342681
Publication date: 27 June 1995
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90012-4
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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