Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
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Publication:1408943
DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0279-6zbMath1068.91016OpenAlexW2072852712MaRDI QIDQ1408943
Publication date: 28 September 2003
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15641
Related Items (7)
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures ⋮ An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit ⋮ Candidate stability and voting correspondences ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem ⋮ Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness ⋮ No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems ⋮ Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
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