Pure strategy Markov equilibrium in stochastic games with a continuum of players.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00041-7zbMath1058.91011MaRDI QIDQ1410583

Subir K. Chakrabarti

Publication date: 14 October 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Atomless measure space of players; Measurable selections; Pure strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Stationary anonymous sequential games with undiscounted rewards, Total reward semi-Markov mean-field games with complementarity properties

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