The dimension for the European Union Council under the Nice rules.

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00903-7zbMath1056.90100MaRDI QIDQ1429939

Josep Freixas

Publication date: 27 May 2004

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Dimension; Real voting systems; Simple games; Weighted majority games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives

90B90: Case-oriented studies in operations research

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Cites Work

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