Buying optimal payoffs in bi-matrix games

DOI10.3390/g9030040zbMath1418.91120OpenAlexW2810124435WikidataQ129629317 ScholiaQ129629317MaRDI QIDQ1630445

Sven Schewe, Anshul Gupta

Publication date: 10 December 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030040

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumbi-matrix gamesleader equilibriumsecure incentive equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05)

Uses Software

• lp_solve
• Gambit

Cites Work

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• Games with secure equilibria
• Leadership games with convex strategy sets
• Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information
• Potential games
• Existence of Secure Equilibrium in Multi-player Games with Perfect Information
• The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
• Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
• Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Formal Methods for Components and Objects

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