An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications
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Publication:1652814
DOI10.1007/S00712-017-0559-ZzbMath1402.91304OpenAlexW2740093589MaRDI QIDQ1652814
Susumu Sato, Toshihiro Matsumura, Sang-Ho Lee
Publication date: 16 July 2018
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80146/8/MSL20170712.pdf
Related Items (9)
Product differentiation, privatization commitment and profitability comparisons ⋮ Optimal partial privatization in an endogenous timing game: a mixed oligopoly approach ⋮ The effects of downstream entry in a vertical mixed oligopoly: the role of input pricing ⋮ Partial privatization in an international mixed oligopoly under product differentiation ⋮ Corporate profit tax and strategic corporate social responsibility under foreign acquisition ⋮ The relationship between privatization and corporate taxation policies ⋮ Comparing welfare and profit in quantity and price competition within Stackelberg mixed duopolies ⋮ On competition and welfare enhancing policies in a mixed oligopoly ⋮ Corporate social responsibility and privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly
Cites Work
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- HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED*
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