On games and equilibria with coherent lower expectations

DOI10.1155/2015/690295zbMath1394.91017OpenAlexW1536686398WikidataQ59118938 ScholiaQ59118938MaRDI QIDQ1666344

Giuseppe De Marco, Maria Romaniello

Publication date: 27 August 2018

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/690295

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Ambiguous games without a state space and full rationality ⋮ On the convexity of preferences in decisions and games under (quasi-)convex/concave imprecise probability correspondences

Cites Work

• A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
• Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
• Nash equilibrium with lower probabilities
• Ambiguous games
• Towards a unified theory of imprecise probability
• Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
• Random belief equilibrium in normal form games
• Stability Theory for Systems of Inequalities. Part I: Linear Systems
• Remarks on Perturbations in Linear Inequalities
• Set-valued analysis

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