Should sophisticated expectations facilitate reaching equilibrium behavior?

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2016.09.015zbMath1408.91152MaRDI QIDQ1709975

Weijun Zhong, Xing Gao, Chao Huang

Publication date: 15 January 2019

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.09.015

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot oligopoly; equilibrium behavior; extrapolative expectations; best-reply dynamic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

91B55: Economic dynamics

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Cites Work

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