Escaping the tragedy of the commons via directed investments

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2011.07.022zbMath1397.91081OpenAlexW1993694207WikidataQ56896045 ScholiaQ56896045MaRDI QIDQ1786393

Francisco C. Santos, Jeromos Vukov, Jorge M. Pacheco

Publication date: 24 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.022

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorycomplex networksstructured populationsevolution of cooperationpublic goods game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Small world graphs, complex networks (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C82) Games involving graphs (91A43) Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

Rewarding endowments lead to a win-win in the evolution of public cooperation and the accumulation of common resources ⋮ Networks beyond pairwise interactions: structure and dynamics ⋮ Impact of shill intervention on the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of synergistic and discounted group interactions in structured populations ⋮ Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner ⋮ Dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift games in structured populations ⋮ Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation

Cites Work

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• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
• The Structure and Function of Complex Networks
• Statistics of Kagomé Lattice
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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