Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments

DOI10.1007/S003550050043zbMATH Open0855.90007OpenAlexW2248049401MaRDI QIDQ1924538FDOQ1924538

Michel Le Breton, Guillaume Hollard

Publication date: 3 February 1997

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050043

zbMATH Keywords

logrollingvote tradingMcGarvey theoremseparable tournaments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (8)

• Incoherent majorities: the McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation
• A characterization of the \(n\)-agent Pareto dominance relation
• An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism
• The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting
• On \(\lambda\)-majority voting paradoxes
• Compromise in combinatorial vote
• A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda's rule
• When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?

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