Arbitrage, strategic inefficiency and self-regulation

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0133-7zbMath1260.91116OpenAlexW2083193841MaRDI QIDQ1944866

Dimitris Voliotis

Publication date: 28 March 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0133-7

zbMATH Keywords

strategic market gamesself-regulationOLG Folk Theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players
• A strategic market game with a mutual bank with fractional reserves and redemption in gold. A continuum of traders
• Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
• A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategles
• Strategic market games with a finite horizon and incomplete markets
• Arbitrage and equilibrium in strategic security markets
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players

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