Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
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Publication:1961954
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00061-5zbMath0955.91014WikidataQ55899881 ScholiaQ55899881MaRDI QIDQ1961954
Publication date: 4 March 2001
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B14: Social choice
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