The curse of the first-in-first-out queue discipline

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.004zbMATH Open1394.90203OpenAlexW2603602121MaRDI QIDQ2013340FDOQ2013340

Lars Peter Østerdal, Trine Tornøe Platz

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcongestionwelfareFIFOLIFOqueue discipline

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• ?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals
• The concert queueing game: strategic arrivals with waiting and tardiness costs
• The concert queueing game: to wait or to be late
• Random queues and risk averse users
• Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence

Cited In (5)

• Bad luck when joining the shortest queue
• Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue
• Equilibrium arrival times to queues with general service times and non-linear utility functions
• Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence
• The BCD queue and its ramifications

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