Principal-agent problem under the linear contract
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Publication:2084610
DOI10.1007/s10878-021-00723-3zbMath1502.91032OpenAlexW3145818018MaRDI QIDQ2084610
Hing-Fung Ting, Guichen Gao, Yong Zhang, Li Ning, Xinxin Han
Publication date: 18 October 2022
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-021-00723-3
Cites Work
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