Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions
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Publication:2098951
DOI10.1515/bejte-2016-0185OpenAlexW2804460388WikidataQ114053189 ScholiaQ114053189MaRDI QIDQ2098951
Steffen Lippert, Addison Pan, Simona Fabrizi
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0185
simulationsvoting rulesgroup decision-makingjury trialreferendahuman-subjects laboratory experimentnon-congruent views
Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
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- A minimal extension of Bayesian decision theory
- Deliberative voting
- Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior
- When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
- Small worlds: Modeling attitudes toward sources of uncertainty
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- An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem*
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