Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits

DOI10.1007/s10479-018-2826-yzbMath1447.91076OpenAlexW2794764273MaRDI QIDQ2196104

Guo Li, Jiasen Sun

Publication date: 28 August 2020

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-2826-y

zbMATH Keywords

double auctioncap-and-trade systememission permit tradingre-allocation of emission permits (RAEP)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Optimizing emission reduction task sharing: technology and performance perspectives

Cites Work

• Measuring the efficiency of decision making units
• The implication of time-based payment contract in the decentralized assembly system
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Centralised reallocation of emission permits using DEA
• A dominant strategy double auction
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• A Pareto optimal auction mechanism for carbon emission rights
• Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating.
• Can double auctions control monopoly and monopsony power in emissions trading markets?
• Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism
• Truthful Bundle/Multiunit Double Auctions
• Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions

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