Signaling and mediation in games with common interests

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.007zbMath1200.91049MaRDI QIDQ2268118

Dinah Rosenberg, Eran Shmaya, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 10 March 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

Related Items

Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution, When is the value of public information positive in a game?, Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited, Public information in Markov games, Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria, Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams, Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness, Signaling and mediation in games with common interests, On the hardness of designing public signals, Experimental design to persuade, Interim partially correlated rationalizability, Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence, Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games, RULE RATIONALITY

Cites Work

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• The positive value of information
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• Comparison of information structures
• Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments