Optimizing over pure stationary equilibria in consensus stopping games
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Publication:2281451
DOI10.1007/s12532-018-0151-8zbMath1433.91012MaRDI QIDQ2281451
Andrew J. Schaefer, Murat Kurt, Amin Dehghanian
Publication date: 19 December 2019
Published in: Mathematical Programming Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12532-018-0151-8
equilibrium selection; branch-and-cut; independence system; veto players; consensus decision-making; stochastic stopping games
91B06: Decision theory
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91A55: Games of timing
Uses Software
Cites Work
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