Secure analysis of dynamic networks under pinning attacks against synchronization

DOI10.1016/j.automatica.2019.108576zbMath1430.91027arXiv1909.00582OpenAlexW2979126997MaRDI QIDQ2288587

Yuzhe Li, Tongwen Chen, Dawei Shi

Publication date: 20 January 2020

Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.00582

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic networksStackelberg gamespinning controlcyber security

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Networked control (93B70)

Related Items (8)

H_∞ asynchronous synchronisation control for Markovian coupled delayed neural networks with missing information ⋮ Stealthy multiplicative attacks against cyber‐physical systems: A gap metric approach ⋮ Secure consensus control for multi‐agent systems against attacks on actuators and sensors ⋮ Event‐based resilience to DoS attacks on communication for consensus of networked Lagrangian systems ⋮ Dynamic event-triggered synchronisation control for complex dynamical networks with stochastic attacks and actuator faults ⋮ Multi‐stage dynamic event‐triggered containment control of nonlinear multi‐agent systems with input‐bounded leaders and time‐varying delay ⋮ Optimal stealthy integrity attacks on remote state estimation: the maximum utilization of historical data ⋮ Kalman filtering under unknown inputs and norm constraints

Uses Software

• Brain Connectivity Toolbox
• Boids

Cites Work

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• YET ANOTHER CHAOTIC ATTRACTOR
• False Data Injection Attacks on Networked Control Systems: A Stackelberg Game Analysis
• Pinning-Controllability Analysis of Complex Networks: An M-Matrix Approach
• A time-varying complex dynamical network model and its controlled synchronization criteria
• Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks
• Existence and uniqueness of open-loop Stackelberg equilibria in linear-quadratic differential games

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