Existence theorems of equilibrium points in stackelberg

DOI10.1080/02331938708843300zbMath0638.90106OpenAlexW2047071794MaRDI QIDQ3780033

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Publication date: 1987

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331938708843300

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium pointsconstraintsbilevel optimizationleader-followerExistence theoremsdynamic Stackelberg gamereaction settwo players static Stackelberg game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Hierarchical systems (93A13) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites Work

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• On the lower semicontinuity of optimal sets in convex parametric optimization
• Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
• Closure and upper semicontinuity results in mathematical programming, Nash and economic equilibria¹
• A Stackelberg solution of dynamic games
• Convex Analysis

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