Crowdsourcing contests

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.02.057zbMath1431.91180OpenAlexW4247845806WikidataQ114387695 ScholiaQ114387695MaRDI QIDQ2332996

Ella Segev

Publication date: 6 November 2019

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.02.057

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryall-pay auctioncrowdsourcingcontest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion ⋮ Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments ⋮ On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Innovation contests with entry auction
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• Contest success functions: an extension
• An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Contest architecture
• Optimal Award Scheme in Innovation Tournaments
• Parallel Innovation Contests

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