Putting free-riding to work: A partnership solution to the common-property problem
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Publication:2380699
DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2008.07.004zbMath1186.91161OpenAlexW2170697740MaRDI QIDQ2380699
Stephen W. Salant, Stephan Schott, Martin D. Heintzelman
Publication date: 8 April 2010
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2008.07.004
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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