Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.013zbMath1282.91171OpenAlexW2248200695MaRDI QIDQ2437819

Anthony Creane, Hideo Konishi, Chiu Yu Ko

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.013

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationlicensingtechnology transferauction games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals

Cites Work

• License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers
• Welfare reducing licensing.
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence

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