Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2444157
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.028zbMath1284.91135MaRDI QIDQ2444157
Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell
Publication date: 8 April 2014
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.028
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