Stochastic differential game model of a common property fishery
Publication:2565019
DOI10.1007/BF02190004zbMath0866.90045OpenAlexW2076558566MaRDI QIDQ2565019
Steffen Jørgensen, David W. K. Yeung
Publication date: 7 January 1997
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02190004
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equationssensitivity analysesfeedback Nash equilibriumMarkov strategiesstochastic differentialcommon-property commercial fisheryrenewable natural resoures
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Economic growth models (91B62) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (19)
Cites Work
- Dynamic common property resources and environmental problems
- Feedback Nash equilibria in a problem of optimal fishery management
- Nonuniqueness of no-memory feedback equilibria in a fishery resource game
- Noncooperative solutions for a differential game model of fishery
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- The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game-theoretic approach
- Markovian equilibrium in a class of stochastic games: Existence theorems for discounted and undiscounted models
- Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games
- On the Economics of International Fisheries
- Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
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