Incentive Effects Favor Nonconsolidating Queues in a Service System: The Principal–Agent Perspective
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Publication:2784094
DOI10.1287/mnsc.44.12.1662zbMath1004.90019OpenAlexW1969008298MaRDI QIDQ2784094
Z. Kevin Weng, Stephen M. Gilbert
Publication date: 16 October 2002
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.12.1662
Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)
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