Pooling Queues with Strategic Servers: The Effects of Customer Ownership

DOI10.1287/opre.2020.2004zbMath1466.90026OpenAlexW3121977120MaRDI QIDQ4994139

Hummy Song, Mor Armony, Guillaume Roels

Publication date: 17 June 2021

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2004

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryqueueing theoryserver poolingcustomer ownership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Related Items (3)

To Pool or Not to Pool: Queueing Design for Large-Scale Service Systems ⋮ Capacity choice game in a multiserver queue: Existence of a Nash equilibrium ⋮ The impact of line-sitting on a two-server queueing system

Cites Work

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• Coping with the Loss of Pooling Synergy in Cellular Manufacturing Systems
• Patient Streaming as a Mechanism for Improving Responsiveness in Emergency Departments
• Incentive Effects of Multiple-Server Queueing Networks: The Principal-Agent Perspective

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