Incentive effects of multiple-server queueing networks: the principal-agent perspective
DOI10.4208/EAJAM.231010.260711AzbMATH Open1302.90043OpenAlexW2146360057MaRDI QIDQ5406904FDOQ5406904
Authors: Sin-Man Choi, Ximin Huang, Wai-Ki Ching, Min Huang 
Publication date: 4 April 2014
Published in: East Asian Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.4208/eajam.231010.260711a
Recommendations
- Incentive effects favor nonconsolidating queues in a service system: The principal-agent perspective
- Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 125775
- Optimal service capacity in a multiple-server queueing system: a game theory approach
- Consolidating or non-consolidating queues: a game theoretic queueing model with holding costs
competitionNash equilibriumprincipal agentcapacity allocationMarkovian queueing systemsincentive theory
Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25)
Cites Work
- Optimal Service Speeds in a Competitive Environment
- Retailer- vs. vendor-managed inventory and brand competition
- Control of the service process in a queueing system
- Markov chains: models, algorithms and applications
- Coordinated supply chain management
- Coordinating supply chains with simple pricing schemes: the role of vendor-managed inventories
- A Classified Bibliography of Research on Optimal Design and Control of Queues
- Server assignment policies for maximizing the steady-state throughput of finite queueing systems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Incentive effects favor nonconsolidating queues in a service system: The principal-agent perspective
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Allocation of service time in a multiserver system
- Non zero-sum stochastic games in admission, service and routing control in queueing systems
Cited In (11)
- Incentive effects favor nonconsolidating queues in a service system: The principal-agent perspective
- Incentive Efficient Control of a Make-to-Stock Production System
- A higher-order interactive hidden Markov model and its applications
- The Impact of Inspection Cost on Equilibrium, Revenue, and Social Welfare in a Single-Server Queue
- Consolidating or non-consolidating queues: a game theoretic queueing model with holding costs
- The principal-agent problem for service rate event-dependency
- Pooling queues with strategic servers: the effects of customer ownership
- Delay Cost and Incentive Schemes for Multiple Users
- Obtaining fast service in a queueing system via performance-based allocation of demand
- Queuing for expert services
- Minimizing equilibrium expected sojourn time via performance-based mixed threshold demand allocation in a multiple-server queueing environment
This page was built for publication: Incentive effects of multiple-server queueing networks: the principal-agent perspective
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5406904)
