Incentive effects of multiple-server queueing networks: the principal-agent perspective

DOI10.4208/EAJAM.231010.260711AMaRDI QIDQ5406904zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sin-Man Choi, Ximin Huang, Wai-Ki Ching, Min Huang

Publication date 4 April 2014

Published in East Asian Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4208/eajam.231010.260711a

zbMATH Keywords

competitionNash equilibriumprincipal agentcapacity allocationMarkovian queueing systemsincentive theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1576689 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 638937 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Classified Bibliography of Research on Optimal Design and Control of Queues
• Allocation of service time in a multiserver system
• Control of the service process in a queueing system
• Coordinated supply chain management
• Coordinating supply chains with simple pricing schemes: the role of vendor-managed inventories
• Incentive effects favor nonconsolidating queues in a service system: The principal-agent perspective
• Markov chains: models, algorithms and applications
• Non zero-sum stochastic games in admission, service and routing control in queueing systems
• Optimal Service Speeds in a Competitive Environment
• Retailer- vs. vendor-managed inventory and brand competition
• Server assignment policies for maximizing the steady-state throughput of finite queueing systems

Cited in

(11)

• Incentive effects favor nonconsolidating queues in a service system: The principal-agent perspective
• Incentive Efficient Control of a Make-to-Stock Production System
• A higher-order interactive hidden Markov model and its applications
• The Impact of Inspection Cost on Equilibrium, Revenue, and Social Welfare in a Single-Server Queue
• Consolidating or non-consolidating queues: a game theoretic queueing model with holding costs
• The principal-agent problem for service rate event-dependency
• Pooling queues with strategic servers: the effects of customer ownership
• Delay Cost and Incentive Schemes for Multiple Users
• Obtaining fast service in a queueing system via performance-based allocation of demand
• Queuing for expert services
• Minimizing equilibrium expected sojourn time via performance-based mixed threshold demand allocation in a multiple-server queueing environment

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