On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions
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Publication:2867479
DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1829zbMath1277.91070OpenAlexW1974703347MaRDI QIDQ2867479
Publication date: 19 December 2013
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1829
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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