Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions

DOI10.1145/2189778.2189781zbMath1322.68255OpenAlexW2000107295MaRDI QIDQ5892187

Carmine Ventre, Paolo Penna

Publication date: 24 September 2015

Published in: ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2189778.2189781

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycollusionalgorithmic mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Distributed systems (68M14) Distributed algorithms (68W15)

Related Items (4)

Scheduling without payments ⋮ Combinatorial auctions without money ⋮ On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable

This page was built for publication: Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions